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Abstract: The economic crisis in Europe exposes the European Union’s (EU) political fragility. How a 
polity made of very different states can live up to the motto “Europe united in diversity” is difficult to 
envisage in practice. In this paper I attempt an “exegesis”—a critical explanation or interpretation of a 
series of published pieces (“the Series”) which explores, first of all, if European unity (and what kind) is 
desirable at all. Second, it presents a methodology running throughout the Series —analogical 
hermeneutics—to approach the problem of unity. Third, it conceptualises the source of unity as political 
identity (and solidarity). Fourth, it advances that such identity could be found in a shared, analogical 
language: the political culture of human rights which is arguably common to all EU present and potential 
member states. Fifth, it submits the conditions under which such political culture could ground political 
identity (through an open public sphere). Notwithstanding that the economic crisis can be solved by means 
of a sound economic strategy (which is not the main object of my work), any successful economic strategy 
requires—as a precondition—a certain degree of political unity (the central concern of my research).  
Keywords: analogical hermeneutics, analogical language, European Union, human rights, political 
culture, political identity, political unity, public sphere, relational interculturalism, religion, secularism, 
solidarity, suprastatism. 
  
The economic crisis has exposed the fragility of Europe’s political building—the European Union (EU). In 
this political building, every “brick” (or member state) is different and claims respect for its singularity. In 
the EU motto: “Europe united in diversity,”1 the “diversity” part is most evident. Tallinn and Dubrovnik 
attest to very different cultural, political, artistic and historical traits. But what can keep Tallin and 
Dubrovnik—Estonia and Croatia—together as part of the same polity? 
This paper follows a series of publications (“the Series”) on European political identity.2 Five published 
journal articles; a chapter in an edited book and a journal article approved for publication; and one article 
that has been submitted for publication and is awaiting response from a journal.3 In order to make it easier 
for the reader to follow the referencing in the text, a shorthand name has been given to each of the pieces: 
European Identity,4 Cosmopolitan Communitarian,5 Political Identity,6 Normative Conceptions,7 Analogical 
Identity,8 Liberal Democracy,9 Cultural Riddles,10 Rethinking Neutrality,   11 Worth Fighting,12 and Europe 
United.13 All the papers are available online.14  
The Series, I put forward here, represents a body of research about one problem (the wobbly political unity 
of the EU), using a specific methodology (analogical hermeneutics), with a coherent conceptual framework 
which hopes to contribute to the study of the topic, presenting a plausible avenue to address the problem 
(building political identity around the common political culture of human rights, or PCHR) and pointing to 
areas of research in need of further development.  
                                            
1 Pablo Cristóbal Jiménez Lobeira, "Exploring Cosmopolitan Communitarianist EU Citizenship – an Analogical 
Reading," Open Insight: Revista de Filosofía 2, no. 2 (2011): 57. "Cultural Riddles of Regional Integration - a 
Reflection on Europe from the Asia Pacific," (2012): 6-7. "Is Europe Still Worth Fighting For? Allegiance, Identity, and 
Integration Paradigms Revisited," ed. CUP (Forthcoming), 6-7. 
 
2 An earlier version of this paper was presented as a Public Lecture at the Australian National University Centre for 
European Studies, Canberra, on the 3rd of July 2012. I am indebted to HE Mr Andrzej Jaroszyński, former 
Ambassador of Poland to Australia, for his very insightful comments, to Dr Matthew Zagor for questions that helped a 
further elaboration of these ideas, to the Director of the Centre, Professor Jacqueline Lo, and to all of the attendants 
for their insights and participation. Thanks to Professor Tom Campbell, Professor Simon Bronitt, Professor Kim 
Rubenstein, Dr Ben Wellings, Dr Lina Eriksson, Dr John Besemeres, Dr Michael Casey, Dr Antonio Missiroli, Dr José 
Manuel Sobrino Heredia, Dr Héctor Velázquez and Professor Peter Hill for very useful orientation during the writing 
of the Series and/or feedback on subsequent versions of this piece. 
3 Complete bibliographical reference for each of them will be given throughout the paper.  
4 This introduction: Pablo Cristóbal Jiménez Lobeira, "Exegetic Introduction: European Identity and Other Mysteries – 
Seeking out the Hidden Source of Unity for a Troubled Polity " SSRN (WPS) (2013). 
5 "Exploring Cosmopolitan Communitarianist EU Citizenship – an Analogical Reading." 
6 "EU Citizenship and Political Identity: The Demos and Telos Problems," European Law Journal 18, no. 4 (2012). 
7 "Normative Conceptions of European Identity - a Synthetic Approach," Australian Journal of Professional and 
Applied Ethics 12, no. 1 & 2 (2010). 
8 "EU Analogical Identity - or the Ties That Link (without Binding)," Australia National University Centre for European 
Studies Briefing Paper Series 1, no. 2 (2010). 
9 "Liberal Democracy: Culture Free? The Habermas-Ratzinger Debate and Its Implications for Europe," Australian & 
New Zealand Journal of European Studies Volume 2, No 2 / Volume 3, No 1., no. May/June 2011 (2011). 
10 "Cultural Riddles of Regional Integration - a Reflection on Europe from the Asia Pacific." 
11 "Veils, Crucifixes and Public Sphere: What Kind of Secularism? Rethinking Neutrality in a Post-Secular Europe," 
(Forthcoming). 
12 "Is Europe Still Worth Fighting For? Allegiance, Identity, and Integration Paradigms Revisited."  
13 "Conclusion: Europe United in Diversity — an Analogical Hermeneutics Contribution to the Social and Political 
Philosophy of the European Union " SSRN (WPS) (2013). 
14 European Identity at: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2087938;  
Cosmopolitan Communitarian at: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1620882; 
Political Identity at: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1682422; 
Normative Conceptions at: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1672479; 
Analogical Identity at: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1652067; 
Liberal Democracy at: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1658784; 
Cultural Riddles at: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2083421; 
Rethinking Neutrality at: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1648711; 
Worth Fighting at: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1990817; 
and Europe United at: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2292770.  
 A glance at the foundational ideals is contrasted with the current situation of the European Union, and 
some thoughts are advanced about the significance of political culture, participation, and solidarity among 
European citizens.15  
These days, however the cause for European unity has become less popular—to put it mildly. In some 
instances it faces not only scepticism but even blunt hostility. The case for European unity is not as 
obvious and clear as it might have been at the time of the Schuman declaration in 1950. This will be 
discussed in the following section. 
 
Is unity desirable at all, and if so, what kind? 
The point of departure of my research is the undemonstrated assumption that the peoples of 
Europe, symbolised and expressed, among other elements by their languages, have an intrinsic, 
self-evident value that should be known, fostered and preserved. If Lithuanians—who form a 
state—or the Welsh—who are a nation—or Neapolitans—who possess a language regardless of 
their being considered today a nation or not—were to disappear, something of intrinsic and 
immense value would be lost. 
The day, in other words, when the Swedish people, their way of life, their love of coffee and 
nature, their history and music, their openness and sense of egalitarianism—conveyed and 
synthesised in the Swedish language—ceased to exist, that day would signify a terrible and 
irreparable loss for Europe and for the world, which although different, is comparable to a certain 
extent to the disappearance of an animal species or a large section of rainforest.16  
I should like to warn the reader about three possible misunderstandings surrounding this idea.17 
The first one is the naïve suggestion that all Swedish people are morally good from the simple 
fact of being Swedish. That is certainly not the case of the Swedish people—or of any other 
people for that matter. In any human group certain individuals behave in ways that are considered 
good (think of the honours, medals, distinctions and other forms of reward from society towards 
certain outstanding people in their midst); others may behave in ways that are considered morally 
bad, not exemplary, reprobate (for example someone convicted of rape or of human trafficking). 
Second, the obtuse thought that appreciating Swedish people and culture is somewhat equivalent 
to affirming their superiority over other human groups and cultures, for instance Russians or 
Norwegians. This is absurd because every people and their culture – symbolised and expressed 
in their language – are unique. The Swedish culture is related to other human cultures but has its 
own facets that are different to the others and enrich them—as much as it may be similarly 
enriched by the particular features of other cultures.  
Third, that arguing for the value of the Swedish peoples and their cultures equates to arguing for 
a particular state. Because among other things, that would ignore those Swedish peoples who do 
not live in the Swedish Kingdom (for instance those who reside in Finland). And in the event that 
a state may become totalitarian or plainly dangerous, that does not make the peoples and 
cultures living in them necessarily part of the state’s atrocities. Think of Russians (or Georgians) 
                                            
15 Jiménez Lobeira, "Is Europe Still Worth Fighting For? Allegiance, Identity, and Integration Paradigms Revisited; 
"Cultural Riddles of Regional Integration - a Reflection on Europe from the Asia Pacific; "Veils, Crucifixes and Public 
Sphere: What Kind of Secularism? Rethinking Neutrality in a Post-Secular Europe." 
16 For me the hypothetical extinction of the Swedish people and their culture would be even worse. But I do not 
intend to elaborate an argument about it here.  
17 Note that these possible misunderstandings could very well be just descriptions of at least some forms of 
nationalism along history—eminently in Europe. My position however is closely tied with peoples and their culture, 
rather than to abstract “nations” (unless the term is used to designate concrete peoples and their language and 
culture), or even less to “nation-states” (i.e. states).  
in the Soviet Union under Stalin, or of innocent Germans (and Jewish Germans) living in the Third 
Reich under Hitler.  
The assumption does not ignore that peoples and cultures, if we take their language as an icon, 
mix and change. In a complicated and intricate history which would be impossible to summarise 
in a few paragraphs, languages evolve. Uralic, Slavic, Germanic and Romance languages 
(among others) developed over centuries in Europe into the current languages that are spoken 
today. In other words, they mutate, there is a sort of relativity to them. Their value is intrinsic and 
self-evident, but not absolute.18 
For all their wrong-doings and mistakes, for all their history of wars and imperialism, the peoples 
and their cultures in a continent that Mazower has called “dark”—and not for the most flattering of 
reasons19—have nonetheless enriched the world in many positive ways. Abstract terms such as 
“western” (ideas, culture, mentality, and so on) or “the west” would mean nothing without a strong 
reference to Europe.  
From the middle of the XIX century to the middle of the XX century, Europe faced self-destruction 
due to the immense power of its increasingly assertive nation-states. From the aftermath of World 
War II to the end what Hobsbawm calls the XX “short century” (1914 - 1991),20 Europe faced a 
different kind of danger, being as it was the front stage of a conflict—the Cold War—between the 
two world superpowers. In the XXI century, with emerging powers represented in the G20, seven 
of the ten fastest growing economies located in Africa, and a general shift of interest in the planet 
towards Asia (as China gains economic, military and political prominence)21 the least of the 
challenges that Europe is facing is irrelevance.  
And if this is true for Europe as a whole, it is so, a fortiori for individual European countries such 
as Luxembourg or Portugal, and even more for nations and peoples living within one state or 
across several of them: Scots in the UK, Ukrainians in Latvia, or Romani in France, Spain and 
other countries. If these and other peoples of Europe, as well as the richness of their languages 
and cultures are to survive and continue to flourish, peace is a first pre-requisite. But it is not 
enough. A pooling of resources, skills and labour is also needed.  
This realisation is obvious in countries of the Baltic region, for instance, for which reason Latvia is 
poised to join the euro in 2014, while Lithuania and Poland are in line to adopt the European 
currency in the coming years. It is also why Croatia worked through a hard agenda (including 
solving border issues with neighbouring Slovenia) that lasted several years, to become a member 
of the EU in 2013, as other Balkan countries continue to advance towards membership as well, 
                                            
18 Groups obviously change with time. The Romance languages in the Iberian Peninsula, for instance, developed 
from vulgar Latin, and progressively differentiated and formed what today we know as Portuguese, Galician, 
Castilian, Catalan and other languages. In the XIII century Alfonso X (the Wise) set the Toledo School of Translators 
who conveyed texts from Arabic, Greek, and Hebrew into Castilian, which was promoted to state language. At the 
same time, nonetheless Alfonso writes poetry (e.g. the Cantigas de Santa María) in Galician-Portuguese, and calls to 
his court varied artists whose mother tongue is Occitan, Galician-Portuguese, Catalan, French (the langue d'oïl from 
northern France) and Italian (originally Tuscan). The evolution of languages in the former Yugoslavia is another, 
more recent example. Tomorrow the cultural and linguistic landscape in Europe may change, with the return of 
Arabic and Turkish as important languages again. People, every concrete human being (unlike abstractions such as 
“nations”) have an absolute value. But as long as certain languages represent those peoples and their cultures, they 
possess an intrinsic value—if always subordinated, conditional and in evolution. 
19 M. Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century  (Vintage Books, 2000). 
20 E.J. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991  (Michael Joseph, 1994). 
21 See to this respect two recent speeches that highlight and spell out these ideas: HIlary Rodham Clinton, "Remarks 
on American Leadership at the Council on Foreign Relations,"  Diplomacy in Action(2013), 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2013/01/203608.htm. And especially: Barack Obama, "Remarks by President 
Obama to the Australian Parliament," (2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-
president-obama-australian-parliament. 
 often undergoing painful economic reforms and swallowing their pride in order to solve historical 
conflicts and thus qualify (just think of Serbia’s arrangements with Kosovo, under the EU’s 
auspices).  
The intrinsic value of each European nation is showcased by its language as a vehicle of 
expression for a certain group of people and their culture.22 Unity is desirable in order to preserve 
those cultures and the viability of the states which host them.23 Unity is a means to preserving 
diversity and enabling it to flourish.24 
These ideas motivated the creation of the European communities (the first one of which was 
dedicated to the production of coal and steel). With the years those communities became what 
today is the EU. However the preservation of peace required constant attention and the pooling of 
resources was critically reliant on a certain unity of the peoples of Europe. The need became 
evident for a common authority which could mediate between different peoples in the face of 
potential conflicts of interest, and which was able to set certain rules and goals for the common 
work. Some sort of legal and political unity was therefore desirable. 
Today economic and legal unity has been attained—to a certain degree. True, the euro crisis has 
revealed that a lot still remains to be done. But the political aspect has been more difficult to 
develop. What the EU is in political terms continues to be debated. Famously it was described by 
Jacques Delors, a former president of the European Commission as “an unidentified political 
object.”25 Also debated is the nature and quality of the EU in terms of the political culture which 
prevails in its member states and which includes the rule of law, democracy and human rights its 
most important elements and symbols.  
As many as the achievements of the EU have been in terms of continental peace and prosperity 
more than sixty years after its beginnings, it becomes ever clearer that the project cannot 
continue to grow unless economic and legal unity are matched by unity in the political realm. The 
rise of Eurosceptic parties all over Europe at a time of economic crisis is no coincidence. But 
even if the effect of those parties were ignored, most European citizens today—regardless of their 
political persuasion—perceive that this political underdevelopment—or in the jargon of political 
European studies this “democratic deficit”—requires attention for the EU to survive and grow—
and for “European citizenship” to mean anything at all. 
Therefore the main question I have attempted to address in the Series is how political unity can 
be envisaged and made more stable. This is closely related to political culture in particular and 
cultural diversity in general. It is never a question of form only, but also one of substance, hence 
the importance of culture and its implications for politics—or political culture.  
There are two sides to political unity: the polity considered as a community of citizens; and the 
polity considered as a legal entity. Unity from the first point of view can be promoted through 
relational interculturalism in an inclusive public sphere.26 The second side can be fostered 
through supranationalism, exemplified by the principle of constitutional tolerance.27 
                                            
22 Jiménez Lobeira, "EU Citizenship and Political Identity: The Demos and Telos Problems," 14-15. 
23 Ibid., 515. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Jacques Delors, "Speech at the First Intergovernmental Conference (of the EU),"  Bulletin of the European 
Communities(1985), http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2001/10/19/423d6913-b4e2-4395-9157-
fe70b3ca8521/publishable_en.pdf. 
26 I take the term relationality from Pierpaolo Donati, see: Jiménez Lobeira, "Is Europe Still Worth Fighting For? 
Allegiance, Identity, and Integration Paradigms Revisited," 6. See also de last section of this exegetic introduction 
(below).  
27 Ibid., 8-9. 
Political unity is, in the face of an increasingly globalised world—and one that has Europe less 
and less at its centre—a necessity in order to preserve and enhance peace, prosperity and the 
flourishing of the peoples of Europe. United, the European peoples can more effectively mitigate 
internal conflict, face external threat, and continue to matter in the changing world of the XXI 
century. 
Yet, unity has many forms. The United Nations, the United Arab Emirates, the African Union, the 
United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the 
Union of South American Nations all express unity, but of different kinds.  
In Europe, the debate regarding political form or regime has revolved around three main 
possibilities. First, the EU as an international organisation with economic purposes and no 
political coordination. Second, the EU evolving into a federal state similar to the USA (or to 
Germany or other federal states), which position has been proposed and endorsed by 
philosophers such as Habermas. Finally, the EU as a mixed commonwealth, an arrangement that 
pushes for some political unity but stops short of becoming a state itself.  
This third possibility conceives of the EU as a polity formed by states but itself remaining 
stateless. Among others, proponents of this position (each with different nuances of course) 
include Neil McCormick, Joseph Weiler, Richard Bellamy and others.28 In the Series I have 
argued in favour of this third possibility, which is in my opinion the regime that is best suited to the 
unity that the peoples of Europe need (see above).  
Unity for the peoples of Europe is a means rather than an end (the ends being their preservation, 
prosperity and flourishing). And the sort of unity more convenient for that end to happen—not only 
the flourishing of “Europe” in abstract but of its peoples (Romanians, Estonians, Danes, and so 
on)—should be one that allows the greatest space possible for each of those particular peoples to 
prosper and flourish.  
Desirable outcomes of European political unity are, therefore, the preservation of the distinct 
peoples and cultures, and their flourishing. Subordinated to that goal and as part of its attainment, 
would be (social) peace and (economic) prosperity; and civic friendship (or solidarity) as part of 
both. Much attention from the media has focused on the economic prosperity (or its compromise: 
the dire situation of the finances, high unemployment, the risk of a break in the euro zone, and so 
on). My perspective seeks to address aspects which—if attended—can ground a prosperous 
economy. But prosperity is not enough, and hence the importance of speaking about social 
peace, civic friendship, and cultural flourishing.  
Further, derived outcomes from a social, economic and political healthy Europe can be its 
significant contribution to world prosperity and peace through the EU’s economic clout, its 
commitment to promote peace in different regions of the planet, and enrich international relations 
by sharing its political culture of human rights. 
Outcomes such as the ones I have just mentioned can come—I submit—from a Europe united in 
diversity as a stateless, analogical polity, an relational, intercultural society, a flexibly integrated 
economy, and an inclusive and open public sphere.  
Before engaging those topics, however I would like to present some notes on the methodology 
that I have used throughout the Series to approach the problem of political unity and other issues 
related to it.  
 
                                            
28 See: ibid; "EU Citizenship and Political Identity: The Demos and Telos Problems; "Exploring Cosmopolitan 
Communitarianist EU Citizenship – an Analogical Reading." 
 Approaching the question: analogical hermeneutics  
The approach I undertook was a theoretical one, though trying to bear in mind the latest empirical 
research. As a theoretical work, the research dealt both with descriptive (conceptual, analytical) 
matters—how things are—as well as with normative ones—how things should be, and why. 
However my analysis used an underlying methodological approach along virtually the whole 
Series. A tool that allows for the weighting of difficult and contrasting choices in the investigation 
of the EU’s political unity. 
The methodology to engage with the problem is called analogical hermeneutics. Analogical 
hermeneutics is used as a key methodological concept throughout the Series, 29 both to 
understand the problem and as a tool to evaluate possible solutions.30 It provides a path to 
conceptualise the European polity, citizenship and identity. It helps to ease the tension between 
the (EU) as a whole, and the individual parts (member states), unity and diversity.31 Analogical 
hermeneutics not only helps to understand (or interpret) what European polity, citizenship and 
identity are, but also what they should be.  
The reason for this is that analogical hermeneutics, of itself, privileges diversity over unity (without 
breaking it). It can aid in approaching normative issues when the desirable outcome is prioritising 
diversity over unity.32 Such is the case of the EU’s political unity.33 Hence analogical 
hermeneutics suits that problem, following the initial premise (explained above) that the goal of 
unity is subordinated to the flourishing of the peoples of Europe, to its diversity—the whole is less 
important than the parts. In order to understand why this method is suitable, a little more must be 
said about the method’s nature. 
Intuitively, analogical hermeneutics could be summarised as a methodology of interpretation. 
Initially “hermeneutics,” a name apparently related to the god Hermes of Greek mythology,34 was 
a way of interpreting texts, of finding or discovering their meaning, a meaning that the texts 
certainly had and could be discovered. Hermeneutics can go beyond and reach out to reality: not 
only of the texts themselves, but also of what the texts refer to—meaning and reference. 
Analogical hermeneutics is an attempt to navigate between the “one meaning” interpretation of 
scientific positivists, and the “infinite meanings” (which often leads to meaninglessness) of at least 
some “postmodernists”.35 For the latter there are in fact so many interpretations that it is 
practically impossible to know which of them is true.  
From Aristotle, Beuchot takes the terms univocal, equivocal, and analogical. A univocal word or 
term has only one possible meaning: it is unambiguous. For instance the word “chess.” There is 
                                            
29 For instance in: "Exploring Cosmopolitan Communitarianist EU Citizenship – an Analogical Reading," 159-60. "EU 
Citizenship and Political Identity: The Demos and Telos Problems," 515. "EU Analogical Identity - or the Ties That 
Link (without Binding)," 14. "Normative Conceptions of European Identity - a Synthetic Approach," 168. "Is Europe 
Still Worth Fighting For? Allegiance, Identity, and Integration Paradigms Revisited," 6-8. "Cultural Riddles of Regional 
Integration - a Reflection on Europe from the Asia Pacific," 7. 
30 "Normative Conceptions of European Identity - a Synthetic Approach," 168. 
31 Cf. "EU Analogical Identity - or the Ties That Link (without Binding)." 
32 See for instance: ibid., 13-14. 
33 "EU Citizenship and Political Identity: The Demos and Telos Problems," 514. 
34 Part god and part man, who was in charge of conveying messages—serving as link of understanding—between 
the gods and men. Mauricio Beuchot, En El Camino De La Hermenéutica Analógica [On the Path of Analogical 
Hermeneutics], Aletheia (Salamanca: San Esteban, 2005), 14-15. 
35 Think for instance of Derrida’s “deconstruction,” which, admittedly, does not necessarily imply that concepts are 
meaningless altogether, but at least that they have multiple—and sometimes conflicting—meanings. See, among 
many other possible examples: J. Derrida, Limited Inc  (Northwestern University Press, 1977), 61-62. See also 
Vattimo’s “weak thinking” proposal which tends to lead to equivocal positions, e.g. in: G. Vattimo and P.A. Rovatti, Il 
Pensiero Debole  (Feltrinelli, 2010); G. Vattimo, A Farewell to Truth  (Columbia University Press, 2013), 7-13.  
no additional meaning other than the name of the game. An equivocal term is one with more than 
one possible interpretation: it is ambiguous. For instance “case,” which may mean “example,” 
“circumstance,” “set of arguments,” “difficulty,” “eccentric person,” “container,” “legal action,” “set 
of grammatical categories,” etc. Note that one of the meanings does not always keep a link, even 
remote, with other meanings. 
In upcoming paragraphs I will explain analogical terms. But before I would like to mention what 
Beuchot’s purpose is in undertaking these distinctions. His idea is to break the impasse between 
the rigid ontology of modernity (univocality of interpretation) and the wobbly relativity of 
postmodernity (equivocality of interpretation). Clearly his intent goes beyond texts and embraces 
reality and different fields of knowledge.36 From the beginning, it occurred to me that his method 
could be of great value for dealing with the problem of unity and diversity in Europe. But I did not 
realise its full potential until the end of my research, to the point that I would advance analogical 
hermeneutics, one of the original contributions of my work to the field of the social and political 
philosophy of EU studies.  
Analogical hermeneutics has one of its roots in Paul Ricoeur’s interpretative model based on 
metaphor. Beuchot points out, however that metaphor is only one of the many forms of analogy. 
Metonym, for instance, is another.37 Analogical hermeneutics, through proportionality, navigates 
between two extremes: on the one hand univocal hermeneutics—typical of scientific positivism—
and on the other hand equivocal hermeneutics—common in postmodernity (or, as Beuchot calls it 
sometimes, “late modernity”). Analogy is a form of meaning that is neither univocal (as is the 
meaning of “platypus”) nor equivocal (as in that of “light,” which can be “medium of illumination 
that makes sight possible”, or “not heavy,” or “not fattening,” etc.). An analogous term has a 
referent and in any case always keeps some similarity with it, even if the similarity is very far from 
the referent.38   
Beuchot mentions several kinds of analogy: of simple inequality (as in “life,” which can be 
vegetative, sensitive, or rational); of attribution (as in “healthy,” predicated properly of an 
organism, and less properly of “healthy food”—in reality food that makes an organism healthy—or 
a “healthy habit”—same reasoning); of proper proportionality (as in “instinct is to animals what 
reason is to human beings”); of improper proportionality or metaphoric as in “flowers are to 
meadows what smiling is to human beings”).39 Note how the first kind of analogy just reviewed is 
closer to univocality and the last one is closer to equivocality.  
Beuchot’s method has as another of its sources Charles Sanders Peirce’s pragmatism, in 
particular his concept of “abduction” which Beuchot uses to enhance his analogical 
hermeneutics.40 He sides with Peirce in asserting that there is a reality independent from a 
conceptual frame—even if only knowable through such a frame—in disagreement with Kant.41 He 
positions himself as a “relative relativist,” since analogical hermeneutics pulls away from 
univocality, hence relativising truth (especially our possibility of knowing it fully), but only to a 
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39 Ibid., 12 - 13. 
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41 "La Naturaleza De La Hermenéutica Analógica," 15. 
 certain degree, therefore not subscribing completely with the “absolute relativity” of equivocal 
positions.  
Beyond Apel’s transcendental pragmatics and Putnam’s conceptual frame, there is a reality that 
exists and can be known—even if under ideal conditions. However, just as Putnam and Apel 
claim to have been inspired by Peirce for their theories of truth as consensus and of pragmatic 
realism—respectively, so Beuchot says to have taken inspiration from Peirce to present a way of 
analogical universalisation. This happens within what Peirce calls abduction, abductive 
abstraction or hypostatic universalisation: a hypothesis presented to others in order to be tested; 
an iconic hypothesis, nevertheless, since its truth does not depend on mere convention, but on its 
representation (however imperfect) of reality.42  
From the departing point in philology and epistemology, analogical hermeneutics has been 
developed and applied to a number of fields in the humanities, social sciences and culture,43 
such as philosophical anthropology,44 legal philosophy,45 political philosophy,46 human rights,47 
philosophy of history,48 and psychoanalysis,49 among others. It has not been applied to the 
problem of political unity and identity, and even less to the case of the EU. It is a contention in the 
Series that analogical hermeneutics can bring fresh insights and approaches to the problem of 
the EU’s political unity on its varied facets.  
Before showing how I use analogical hermeneutics along the Series—for it is a tool to deal with 
every topic developed in it—I would first like to illustrate briefly how Beuchot himself applies his 
concept to three well known areas of study in social and political philosophy. The first one is the 
discussion between formal and material ethics. This second one regards the debate between 
liberalism and communitarianism. The third one is an interesting analysis that he undertakes on 
the notions of prudence in Aristotle, reflective judgement in Kant, and reflective equilibrium in 
Rawls.50  
First example: in the context of the renewed interest in the connection between ethics and politics 
(which is relatively obvious in Classical and Medieval philosophy, but relatively foreign in Modern 
philosophy from the Renaissance onwards), Beuchot speaks about a contest between “justice” 
and “the good” similar to that between formal v material ethics.  
Formal ethics, contrary to its initial promise, eventually ends up adopting at least some material, 
axiological contents. Contemporary formal ethics, for instance discursive ethics (Habermas, 
Apel), is full of logical, methodological, ontological and anthropological assumptions—of a 
substantive or “material nature”.51 In agreement with Dussel, Beuchot mentions as some of those 
material elements the value of life, and respect for others.52 And drawing from Lévinas, Beuchot 
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and Culture] (México, D. F.: Eón-Universidad Iberoamericana, 2006). 
44 M. Beuchot, Antropología Filosófica: Hacia Un Personalismo Analógico-Icónico  (Fundación Emmanuel Mounier, 
2004). 
45 Mauricio Beuchot Puente, Filosofía Del Derecho, Hermenéutica Y Analogía  (Universidad Santo Tomas). 
46 M. Beuchot, Filosofía Política  (Torres, 2006). 
47 Mauricio Beuchot, Interculturalidad Y Derechos Humanos [Interculturality and Human Rights], Filosofía (México, D. 
F.: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México; Siglo XXI, 2005); M. Beuchot, Filosofía Y Derechos Humanos: (Los 
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48 M. Beuchot and Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Hermenéutica 
Analógica Y Filosofía De La Historia: Del Fragmento Como Símbolo Del Todo  (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 
México, 2011). 
49 J. Tubert-Oklander and M. Beuchot, Hermenéutica Analógica Y Psicoanálisis  (Torres Asociados, 2008). 
50 All of them taken from his book on political philosophy: Beuchot, Filosofía Política. 
51 Ibid. Chapter 5: “Hermenéutica y política”.  
52 Enrique Dussel, Etica De La Liberacion Edad Globalizacion Y Exclusion, Second ed. (Ed. Trotta, 1998), 129-30. 
points out how a person can only enter in dialogue with someone else if the other one is prepared 
to respect their life, if he is not going to kill them. Other presuppositions have to follow: for 
instance that the other one is not lying and that in the discussion she will follow some rules of 
logic or argumentation.53  
But the link between formal and material ethics does not go in one direction only. Consider the 
most basic material element: that of respecting each other’s life. “Life” has to be defined: there is 
biological life, but also concepts as “good life,” or “quality of life”. These notions have to be 
discussed through deliberation and argumentative dialogue, in other words making use of formal 
ethics. 
Neither is formal ethics exempt of material or axiological contents, nor can material ethics claim 
complete independence from formal ethics to clarify its axiological contents. From an analogical 
hermeneutics perspective, confluence of those two partial positions ends up in a more 
comprehensive point of view that includes both.54 I could develop a little further that in this case 
univocality would be given by material ethics; equivocality, by formal ethics. Analogical 
hermeneutics would see both as part of ethics, considering that some elements are material and 
cannot be ignored; while other elements are formal and are built discursively. In the end, both 
positions have learned from and enriched each other.  
The second example concerns the debate between liberalism and communitarianism. Analogical 
hermeneutics will attempt a balance, taking each position to their limit—to their “proportional 
limit”—in order to attain harmony, so that liberalists recognise some community rights and 
communitarians give full importance to individual (human) rights. The way to achieve such a 
harmonious new situation is through the analogical exercise of prudence or phronesis, in order to 
discover where conflicting positions can be compatible and how to attain the lesser pain or loss to 
each of them when some loss is unavoidable. Such “proportional balance” attained through 
phronesis (Beuchot calls it “analogy in action”) brings about justice.55  
Analogical hermeneutics should then bear both proportional freedom and proportional equality. 
Proportional freedom would mean that always, within the framework of the rule of law, individuals 
should be allowed to enhance their potential, their skills, their effort, and to be in that way different 
from others to a certain extent (for instance in the amount of wealth they accumulate). At the 
same time, proportional equality would translate into minimum life standards for all people (a 
minimum wage perhaps), welfare for the less fortunate in society (those suffering from sickness, 
accidents, a troublesome family situation, or an unfortunate upbringing). Funding for those needs 
could come from (reasonable) taxation of the most fortunate in society, with incentives or offsets 
in case they undertake solidarity initiatives to help others.  
Beuchot brings to mind that the third postulate of the French Revolution—fraternity—is often 
overlooked: unlike freedom and equality, fraternity could be, in Beuchot’s mind, the key to 
mediating between and harmonising liberalism and communitarianism.56 At any rate, the process 
of harmonising is again a task for analogical hermeneutics, with univocality being an unchecked 
communitarian position, and equivocality an unchecked liberal (individualistic) stand. Following 
Gadamer,57 Beuchot emphasises again that the way to interpret a reality in order to achieve its 
improvement is phronesis or political prudence.58 
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 A third example of analogical hermeneutics at work can be the following. Closely connected with 
the debate between liberalism and communitarianism are the ideas of one of the most prominent 
political philosophers of the XX century, John Rawls. In the discussion regarding the power of the 
state vis-à-vis that of the individuals or civil society, Beuchot compares Aristotle’s concept of 
phronesis (practical or moral wisdom),59 with Kant’s reflective judgement, and Rawls’s reflective 
equilibrium, finding some parallels. Phronesis in Aristotle ponders what is good in different 
possible actions. Through reflection (deliberation with oneself) and deliberation (with others), a 
prudential judgement is arrived at, which illuminates the best course of action. Phronesis is 
therefore essential for moral and political life: it is in Aristotle’s system of ideas practical wisdom, 
the wisdom that is concrete and contingent (changing). It changes therefore according to 
circumstances, and it always depends on the context.60 
Kant’s reflective judgement is a regulative ideal which balances different courses of action in 
tension with each other.61 For Beuchot, the reflective judgement—along with Kant’s conceptions 
on teleology and aesthetics—deals with the dimension of the concrete. This dimension could 
remain on the merely subjective realm (as is the case with judgements of taste). Yet the reflective 
judgement also has the capacity to acquire universality through the atmosphere that the 
conditions of possibility of action provide. And through the categorical imperative, this possibility 
extends not only to individual but also moral action. Since individual action, once it fulfils that 
maxim, comes to acquire objective and universal validity. Kant’s reflective judgement presents a 
systematic regulative ideal, which can pass from partial actions to a systematic practicality.62  
Beuchot sees a close relation between the former two kinds of judgement (Aristotle’s judgement 
of practical wisdom and Kant’s reflective judgement), with Rawls’s reflective equilibrium.63 As 
seen above, the validity of the aesthetic judgment is subjective, yet it becomes objective through 
the fulfilment of the maxim or categorical imperative of objectivity or universality in the individual 
action. In other words, individual action should be able to be universalised through what Kant 
called “enlarged mentality”.64 In Beuchot’s view Rawls builds on Kant’s enlarged mentality and 
understands his reflective equilibrium as a mediator, combining teleology and autonomy for the 
achievement of justice and of a good life (since Rawls seeks to integrate duty and happiness). As 
Arendt had done in her own way, Rawls combines Aristotle and Kant and sees their theories not 
as opposing but complementary.65 
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65 Beuchot, Filosofía Política, Chapter 6: Estado de derecho y sociedad. One place where Rawls defines the concept 
of reflective equilibrium is: J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition  (Harvard University Press, 1999), 42-25. 
Beuchot notes two more examples: Martha Nussbaum (The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy 
Beuchot concludes that phronesis is the sense of balance and measurement we give our actions. 
Phronesis provides an idea of proportion, of the amount of strength that must be given to actions 
conducive to the good. Reflective judgment, in its turn, seeks for a balance or mediation in 
actions, so that they do not remain in a particular, individual good or taste, but rather enlarge its 
scope in order to achieve the common good. And reflective equilibrium combines, again, 
concreteness and universality, principles and contingency.66 Aristotelian phronesis—Beuchot 
concludes—is proportional; it is analogy put into practice. Kantian reflective judgment is, similarly, 
an exercise in weighing or proportionality, of “living analogy”. And Rawlsian reflective equilibrium 
seeks to moderate, nuance and bring proportion to the discussion on distributive justice. Even 
Gadamer’s “fusion of horizons” is a resource to universalise, through the use of analogy or 
similarity, in order to connect to the position of the others with whom one is in dialogue.67 
Though the use of analogical hermeneutics will become clearer in the following sections, here I 
would like to sketch out how the method is used on the main parts of the Series, namely the 
problem of unity, the content of unity, the language for unity, the stage for unity, and the building 
of unity.  
Regarding the problem of unity in the EU, one possible extreme view could be that of regarding 
Europe as one country or even one nation (univocality). Political control becomes central. A 
common language is chosen either by a majority of native speakers inside the EU (with German 
as a possible winner) or by a majority of non-native speakers (perhaps English). A single banking, 
finance, fiscal and monetary system is adopted.  
On the other extreme (equivocality) Europe is dismembered so that countries (member states) 
stand by themselves and if anything carry out some trade with each other and cooperate 
occasionally on issues such as educational exchange or military alliances. Each of them keeps 
their own language and manages their own internal and external-internal affairs. The euro is 
dismantled and each country assumes responsibility for its own fiscal, financial, and social 
problems.  
Those positions do not exist as such, but some come very close, with the EU becoming an 
international organisation for trade (on the equivocal side) or a federal state (on the univocal one). 
In the series I use analogical hermeneutics to propose a kind of unity that translates into a polity 
(the EU at present is one, after all), away from a loose international organisation. At the same 
time I argue that the EU should not become a state. That would go too far towards univocality.  
The initial assumption about the intrinsic value of the peoples of Europe (and their culture and 
language) provides a framework in which unity is promoted to allow their protection, but enough 
freedom is maintained so that they may continue to flourish in their diversity (see above). The 
main referent of unity is a state, with the EU interpreted only in an analogical way, as a quasi-
state—short of becoming one—and yet maintaining links that hold the peoples of Europe (at least 
those in the EU) together.  
I try to approach in a similar way the related matter of political belonging symbolised by 
“Citizenship of the Union,” a concept that seems even more difficult to grasp than the already 
abstract question about the political form, the regime (kind of polity) of the EU. As I try to show in 
Cosmopolitan Communitarian and above all in Political Identity,68 analogical hermeneutics proves 
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 especially adept to deal with this particular problem. Indeed, EU citizenship is like state 
citizenship but not quite. On the univocal side citizenship is directly related to a concrete state. 
(Hence the EU should become a state.) On the equivocal side EU “citizens” are already citizens 
of their respective states—in fact EU citizenship can be granted only to nationals of member 
states. EU citizenship is therefore superfluous.  
Yet from the point of view of analogical hermeneutics, EU citizenship is an analogical way of 
interpreting (or understanding) citizenship. The main or original referent is belonging to a “city” 
(polis), i.e. ordinary state citizenship, for instance citizenship of the sovereign state of Portugal 
(officially the “Portuguese Republic”). With this in mind, the univocal conception would be one of 
citizenship of, say, the “United States of Europe”.69 The equivocal understanding would have 
space for no EU citizenship at all. The analogical perspective presents EU citizenship as placed 
along the spectrum between univocality and equivocality.  
Political belonging to the EU can be viewed then as a weaker form of citizenship—in part similar 
to “proper” citizenship but in part different—but nevertheless not devoid of meaning. It is a 
subordinated belonging in comparison with “national” (member state) affiliation, but still existing 
and real. It is possible to be a citizen of the Romanian state and of the European polity. And 
“citizenship” in either case may mean something different—if not completely unrelated. I 
developed this explanation in Political Identity.70 
As for the “content” of unity, its substance, its binding force, along the series I have called it 
“European identity”. Its specific nature has been and continues to be debated. Its result from the 
institutional point of view is political unity. And from the social perspective one of its clear fruits is 
solidarity or civic friendship. At the beginning of my research I found several definitions of what 
European identity was—and positions about what it should be. Often they were in conflict with 
each other. Analogical hermeneutics was useful here to analyse each of the different claims, 
assess their validity and attempt harmonisation with the other positions. In the end I proposed an 
analogical identity which took elements from each of the stands on the subject, ordered them and 
gave a more comprehensive and nuanced view of European identity—one which could take part 
of each position without having to renounce to the contributions of other positions.  
Analogical hermeneutics also appears in the treatment of a difficult problem closely connected 
with the building of identity (and therefore with the attainment of political unity): political culture. In 
Worth Fighting71 I argue that culture in general and political culture in particular was not an issue 
in the foundational years of the European communities. But the reason was not that it is not 
important in the formation of identity and the consolidation of unity in any successful polity. In 
Liberal Democracy72 I try to show how even the apparently more value-aseptic political 
organisation—liberal democracy—possesses some implicit values that make its existence 
possible and without which it would collapse.  
Rather, the reason was that political culture was very similar among the first six member states; 
similar enough not to be an issue. As the European communities grew into a Community and 
then a Union, the cultural diversity of the peoples inhabiting the member states grew too. 
Immigration has only accelerated this process. Social and political cohesion have become more 
challenging, to put it mildly.73 Culture—that set of elements expressed in language that convey a 
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way of life and a world view, an at least tentative answer to the search for meaning that every 
human being experiences—influences not only the social texture but also the political one. It is 
obvious why: the politeia (polity) is conformed of politai (citizens). And citizens are human beings, 
therefore inevitably susceptible to having a culture, to being cultural in this sense.  
To this situation I bring again analogical hermeneutics in the form of relational interculturalism in 
the social atmosphere and secularity in the public sphere. Relational interculturalism will be 
explained in more detail in the last section (below). But the role of analogical hermeneutics is to 
mediate and harmonise between two extremes.  
On the univocal side, monoculturalism is the idea that new, culturally different citizens should 
conform to the culture of the host polity. In order to belong, they most leave their own culture (as 
defined above, including their worldview and their language) and assimilate to the culture of their 
new country. Different forms of ostracism or outright expelling from society follow if the newly 
arrived do not assimilate.  
On the equivocal side is multiculturalism, understood as the push towards diversity with a peculiar 
view of tolerance, meaning respect so that each group can develop in their own culture. Groups 
compete for recognition, minorities grow vocal. Society becomes more fractured, as tolerance of 
groups with particular cultural backgrounds brings respect but little interaction. In the extreme, 
parallel societies inhabit the one polity, with undesirable results.  
The referent for an analogical interpretation (hermeneutics) of this situation is culture. Analogical 
hermeneutics tends more towards the equivocal side, but without renouncing the referent, i.e. a 
culture for the polity. This political culture cannot be a strong one—as monoculturalism would 
have it. But it is not a fragmented landscape of parallel cultures either. Relational 
interculturalism74 creates a way for different cultures not only to tolerate each other, but to mix to 
a certain degree; something that Beuchot (when speaking about the problem) has called 
mestizaje (blending).75  
The terms should be no surprise as the particular context of his analysis concerns the co-
existence, dialogue and blending to a certain degree of different strands of Mexican culture and 
society that were once different but which over half a millennium have become a more or less 
stable feature of the country’s (its groups’ and individuals’) character. “Western” (European) 
culture was conveyed mainly by Spain at the height of its power in the XVI century, but thereafter 
is also derived from English culture (directly from Britain or indirectly through the United States), 
and French culture.76  
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 European culture entered in contact sometimes violent, sometimes respectful and productive, 
with pre-European cultures (some of which survive to this day—the language of the Aztecs, 
Nahuatl, still counts around two million speakers in Mexico, Central America and Southern United 
States). This subject is highly relevant in most of Latin America, as a region of the world which 
seeks on the one hand to develop (and therefore adopt more western ways such as for instance 
democracy and economic growth) while on the other hand keeping its cultural diversity and its 
cultural mix alive and flourishing.77 
Though I take from Beuchot the idea of analogical hermeneutics to attempt tackling the cultural 
problem, my study differs from his in at least two counts. Firstly, his analysis is focused on the 
conflict between the western culture that largely informs Latin American culture today, and the 
cultures of peoples who were there before the arrival of the Europeans, which have mixed to a 
certain extent with them, and yet remain in other ways distinct and independent from the main, 
dominant western culture. My application, though concerned with peoples that have been in 
Europe for a long time (for instance the Roma people), is trying to address mainly the pressing 
difficulties that have arisen from immigration. Note how the French riots of 2005, the English riots 
of 2011 and the Swedish riots of 2013 have been associated, at least partially, with the situation 
of immigrants in the respective countries (lack of opportunities, social exclusion, and others).78  
The second difference in my application of analogical hermeneutics to the intercultural problem is 
the additional charge of tension in the problem of immigration caused by the newly arrived 
European residents’ (some having attained citizenship, some remaining in a civic limbo even for 
two or three generations, like large groups of Turks in Germany) cultural background with 
unmistakable religious tints. The level that this feature reaches in Europe has no equal in the 
Latin American situation. Why religion causes so much scandal in a subcontinent that throughout 
history has been deeply religious is an interesting matter that I try to address mainly in Rethinking 
Neutrality and in Worth Fighting.79 It is also commented on in the corresponding section below.  
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78 I should warn against a possible interpretation of my comment as casting doubts on immigration. Europe 
throughout history has seen incessant waves of migration from other regions and to other regions. In fact, for an 
ageing subcontinent with below replacement birth rates, Europe, a region of emigrants, needs immigrants in order to 
survive. It’s economic, political and also social and cultural health badly needs immigrants. Precisely, my point is not 
how to avoid immigration, but rather how Europe can deal with immigration in a constructive and intelligent way 
(because that is and should be considered its new reality).  
79 Jiménez Lobeira, "Is Europe Still Worth Fighting For? Allegiance, Identity, and Integration Paradigms Revisited; 
"Veils, Crucifixes and Public Sphere: What Kind of Secularism? Rethinking Neutrality in a Post-Secular Europe." 
Let for the moment the idea suffice that cultural stands, worldviews concerned with meaning (of 
life and the afterlife, of suffering, of the material and immaterial realms, of what a good life is, and 
other such metaphysical questions) can either be religious or secular. For as long as people 
holding religious or secular views know that theirs is a belief system—which for them provides the 
best explanation and light to their search for meaning which however may not be accepted by 
others—and as long as they acknowledge that respect, dialogue, and mutual learning is the way 
ahead, a constructive atmosphere will prevail. When, however, people possessing a particular 
religious or secular worldview believe themselves to have the only possible answer, and exclude 
from the public sphere or mainstream society those who think differently, then a big problem 
arises.  
Undeniably, different brands of religion (and in particular of the Christian religion) have been 
guilty in the past of intolerance and even persecution in Europe and elsewhere. Think of the 
importance that the founders of the United States of America confer to religious freedom, as part 
of their reasons to emigrate west was religious persecution in their original homeland, Britain or 
other European countries.  
Notwithstanding, today there might be a different danger: that some might confuse secularity—
the secular state and civic space that has been an achievement after hundreds of years and 
forms part of today’s political culture of human rights (PCHR)—with secularism, and therefore ban 
people from mainstream society or exclude them from the public sphere on account of their 
culture being religious, or even only showing religious symbols as part of their identity. This is the 
case in the debate about banning people from universities or other public spaces just because 
they wear an Islamic veil.80  
Analogical hermeneutics applied to the situation in Europe translates into a European cultural 
landscape that is on the one hand happy with the traditions, history and language of the peoples 
that have been (and remained) there for hundreds of years. In political culture, two powerful 
streams of richness in this sense are social democracy and Christian democracy, with 
corresponding parties that shaped the political culture Europe has today, also if Europe is thought 
of as only the EU. The result has been what I call the PCHR (see corresponding section below).  
On the other hand, analogical hermeneutics means openness to the “new” cultural traditions 
including Islam.81 The process is not easy. But it needs more than just “respect” or “tolerance”. It 
requires nuanced engagement in both directions. This is what relational interculturalism brings 
about. And it entails necessarily facing a connected issue which must be dealt with as a task for 
analogical hermeneutics too: inclusiveness in the public sphere. 
Though I treat to some extent the issue of the public sphere in Worth Fighting,82 Cultural 
Riddles83 and Liberal Democracy,84 it is in Rethinking Neutrality85 where I analyse this issue in 
greater depth with contributions to the discussion in the field that I shall explain further on. But 
here too analogical hermeneutics can be seen at work. The public sphere would be univocal 
when only one voice can be heard. Any belief system—be it religious or secularist—with 
                                            
80 This matter is discussed at length in Rethinking Neutrality: "Veils, Crucifixes and Public Sphere: What Kind of 
Secularism? Rethinking Neutrality in a Post-Secular Europe." 
81 Islam, of course, is not new in Europe. Among the many pieces of evidence to attest it, consider that a big portion 
of today’s Portugal and Spain conquered and named “Al-Andalus,” a Muslim state established as early as the VIII 
century and existent until the very year in which Columbus arrived  on the American continent (1492).  
82 Jiménez Lobeira, "Veils, Crucifixes and Public Sphere: What Kind of Secularism? Rethinking Neutrality in a Post-
Secular Europe." 
83 "Cultural Riddles of Regional Integration - a Reflection on Europe from the Asia Pacific." 
84 "Liberal Democracy: Culture Free? The Habermas-Ratzinger Debate and Its Implications for Europe." 
85 "Veils, Crucifixes and Public Sphere: What Kind of Secularism? Rethinking Neutrality in a Post-Secular Europe." 
 pretention of exclusivity will create a univocal atmosphere in the public sphere.86 An equivocal 
situation would be one in which anyone has a voice without needing a connection with the others; 
a situation very likely to make “Babel” of the public sphere. And a very dangerous one, for real 
dialogue can be hardly attained.  
The analogical situation will come if no voice is allowed to dominate excluding others 
(univocality). The different voices can express themselves in their particular opinions as much as 
possible, while the public sphere still maintains a common link that harmonises and serves as a 
means of communication. This element is secularity (which in the paper I distinguish from 
secularism to bring clarity to the debate on “the problem of religion”).87 Though I do not agree 
completely with Habermas in his outline,88 I use it as a grounding point, and complement it with 
contributions from Casanova, Taylor and Weiler, among others. Secularity is defined as an open 
atmosphere, a more or less neutral—or at least inclusive—medium, where views from different 
belief systems or worldviews can be expressed about the things concerning the polity. A medium, 
finally, that is not a belief system itself (therefore it is distinguished from secularism).  
Secularity allows a plurality of voices, maintaining certain common elements through very basic 
rules and attitudes that must be followed by all. At the same time secularity is not one of the 
voices—a worldview—itself. It is in that sense a more or less neutral platform, an open framework 
for the different views to express themselves, while remaining a platform, not an agglomeration of 
parallel discourses.89  
A polity where every voice were respected and listened to seriously; where cultural diversity were 
valued; and where everybody was enthusiastic about unity; would still need a common language, 
even if one of sorts. In Cosmopolitan Communitarian I acknowledged that problem and explored 
a few options at the level of speculation. Concretely I pondered the possible value of Pera’s 
proposal about a “civic religion” for Europe, hypothetically fulfilling the needed role of common 
language.90 The idea however has shortcomings that come more clearly to light by applying 
analogical hermeneutics to this particular problem, also relevant and indeed essential for the 
main concern of the Series, the question about European political unity. The analysis becomes 
easier now that we have touched on the issue of the public sphere.  
As I have explained (above), analogical hermeneutics aids understanding of the intricacies of the 
religion and secularism debate, and takes us to a situation where poles can be harmonised to a 
                                            
86 Admittedly, due to lack of space, I do not spell out the analogical hermeneutics analysis in the paper.  
87 Which, in a similar way to what happens with the “Muslim problem,” can be misleading. The “Muslim” problem is in 
reality the problem that some in Europe have in accepting the relevance that Islam has for a significant number of 
European residents. Likewise, the “problem of religion” is the problem that some have with religious views or 
practices, or even appearances, as in the discussion around the Islamic veil, that for some European residents or 
citizens are meaningful or even deeply relevant.  
88 For instance in his view about the language that has to be used in public debate. All religious categories for him, 
while having access to the political stage, must translate their claims into a language that everybody can understand. 
That common language is assumed to be secular. Admittedly, Habermas assigns to secular citizens the task of 
helping religious citizens “translate” their discourse into secular categories. Yet I do not see why, in a public sphere 
that is secular but not secularist, translations could [should this be ‘could not’? occur in both directions. Under a 
relational interculturalist paradigm, secular citizens could be influenced by religious ones as much as religious 
citizens could be influenced by secular ones. The relationship goes both ways. There might be concepts in the 
secular language that enrich religious language, but there might be religious concepts too with no equivalent (no 
translation) in the secular language, that could however enrich it. But this is a task for further research, as I outline in: 
Jiménez Lobeira, "Conclusion: Europe United in Diversity — an Analogical Hermeneutics Contribution to the Social 
and Political Philosophy of the European Union ". 
89 Because the analogical tool in this case is related to “secular,” it becomes acutely important that the terms 
“secularity” and “secularism” are properly defined and distinguished from each other. I take this task in Rethinking 
Neutrality and summarise it in this paper, in the section about the public sphere (below).  
90 Jiménez Lobeira, "Exploring Cosmopolitan Communitarianist EU Citizenship – an Analogical Reading," 162-65. 
certain degree. I have called that situation “secularity,” defined as an open-frame atmosphere. 
Throughout my research I have come to think that a religion—even a civil one like Pera’s—is not 
a wise option if we visualise the belief-system spectrum with analogical hermeneutics. 
The analysis differs from the one before in that we are not considering the spectrum of, on the 
one hand, a belief-system or worldview in (exclusive) charge of the public sphere—a belief-
system that could be religious or secularist—and on the other hand a complete absence of order, 
with voices sounding in parallel and basically no dialogue in the public sphere. 
Rather, the spectrum runs between two radically opposed belief-systems. Borrowing Taylor’s 
terminology we could call it the immanence-transcendent spectrum.91 On the one hand we have 
the univocality of an immanentist position—a position, this is, that states there is no other option 
apart from immanence (holding what Taylor calls a closed frame). On the other hand we have the 
equivocality of transcendent positions, offering each in its own way a connection with a divinity or 
a transcendent state, something that escapes the immanence of the here and now in which 
western societies largely live (Taylor’s “immanent frame”). Positions, at the same time, that point 
towards something difficult or impossible to define in “simple” (secular) words, and in the extreme, 
incapable of dialogue and compromise, Otto’s ganz Andere (the “wholly Other”).92 
Along the spectrum there is a large number of people who are neither immanentists nor 
transcendentalists. As Davie has shown, most people in today’s Europe rather live somewhere 
along that spectrum.93 That is Taylor’s view too. Analogical hermeutics will pull gently away from 
univocality, along the spectrum towards equivocality, but mindful of still keeping some unity of 
meaning. With analogical hermeneutics, a situation can be conceived which keeps weak 
resemblance with a clearly univocal position on immanence, yet with openness to the possibility 
of transcendence in different degrees. Note that along the spectrum there is space too for 
those—perhaps a majority—who do not have strong views in favour of immanence or 
transcendence, and prefer to regard the topic with a drop of scepticism—or simply indifference.  
Under this scenario, it becomes easier to see why a religion of any kind could not be an element 
of unity in analogical hermeneutics terms. It would mean a position in one of the extremes of the 
immanence-transcendence spectrum, trying to impose (or sell) itself to all. Beuchot notes that (I 
would say paradoxically and perhaps ironically) in the extreme, univocality and equivocality 
sometimes coincide. This would be true of an extreme immanentist position or an extreme 
transcendentalist position. Both would contain the less attractive features of “religious” when that 
word is used to designate fanatic attitudes.94  
                                            
91 See for instance his conception of “the immanent frame” in chapter 15 of: C. Taylor, A Secular Age  (Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 539ff. 
92 R. Otto, The Idea of the Holy  (OUP USA, 1958), 25ff. 
93 Grace Davie, "Religion in Europe in the 21 Century: The Factors to Take into Account," European Journal of 
Sociology 47, no. 02 (2006). See her interesting categorisation of the empirical results in today’s Europe: “Historic 
churches,” “believing without belonging,” “vicarious religion,” and others.   
94 For all their mutual animosity, religious and secularists fanatics may end up with very similar views about “the 
other”. Not even a “religion without God” would be advisable. Besides, from a common sense point of view, a religion 
could not in practice be inclusive of all. If it were “civic” as Pera wants, why bother calling it “religion” and put off so 
many citizens that are sceptical or even have an aversion—justified or not—towards it? Besides, the concept would 
put off even that camp supposed to feel sympathy for it, the religious one. For they could argue that such 
arrangement is but a caricature of religion (therefore showing disregard for the many citizens that are religious in 
different ways; or that religion should not be used as an instrument to temporary affairs; or that religion and politics 
must be separated to keep each other in check, rather than mixed. As I have shown in (Jiménez Lobeira, "Veils, 
Crucifixes and Public Sphere: What Kind of Secularism? Rethinking Neutrality in a Post-Secular Europe."), a similar 
set of contradictions faces Beck’s “god of one’s own” idea. Finally, Pera’s idea is a “Christian civil religion” which 
brings one more degree of complexity to the issue, as religious citizens who are not Christian could feel excluded to 
a certain extent—think of Jewish and Muslim citizens for instance. Pope Benedict, Without Roots : The West, 
 If, however, a civil religion appears problematic as a candidate for the common language that the 
European polity needs to build its identity and unity, I argue that the political culture of human 
rights (PCHR) is a much more adept candidate. And so in this section it remains to be shown how 
analogical hermeneutics contributes to the understanding of this political culture as a common 
language for Europe.  
Language is a vehicle of expression. It reveals ways of life, history, experiences, and worldviews. 
It communicates artistic creativity, technology, and opinions. Language could be seen as pure 
convention or as map of reality. Probably it is both. When we consider the Polish language, it is 
not only a system of symbols but a window into peoples who write, sing, discuss, trade, debate, 
teach and play using it. It is an entry to the realm of Slavic peoples. There are expressions, 
sayings, jokes, poems, that strictly speaking cannot be translated into another language without 
losing nuances that will only shine fully in Polish.  
I do not pretend that the PCHR can be a language in the sense that Polish is a language. But I 
claim (see corresponding section below) that PCHR can connect Europeans, and express what 
the peoples of Europe are and think, to an extent sufficient enough to have a shared identity (if 
weaker than the one experienced among those who speak a common language, like Polish) and 
to aid European unity. But the explanation becomes simpler with the aid of analogical 
hermeneutics.  
The PCHR inspired and motivated a growing body of positive law already existing in the EU and 
the Council of Europe.95 The reason why I do not speak simply of human rights, but of a PCHR is 
precisely to distinguish between the positive body of laws already in place with an institution in 
charge of interpreting and applying them the judiciary, and the original inspiration that made them 
be accepted in general terms by all state members of the EU and by many other European 
states. There is a shared awareness in Europe that does not exist in other parts of the world.96 
An awareness shaped by common historical and sometimes dramatic experiences that are 
unique.  
PCHR resembles a language, a vehicle of expression that reveals the culture of the people who 
“speak” it. But PCHR is not a language in the stronger sense of the word, the one given by the 
main or univocal referent, for instance Danish. It is rather analogical: less strong in its capacity for 
expression, yet more ductile, flexible and porous to accommodate different peoples and cultures, 
both those who have been in Europe since the beginnings of the European communities, and 
those who have arrived recently through immigration. PCHR can harmonise and receive 
contributions from every EU country, as well as from the historically strong political culture 
streams of Social Democracy, with roots in the Enlightenment, and Christian Democracy (which 
in turn has roots in Judeo-Christianity). But it can also stretch and receive new cultural influences 
in politics such as that of Islam.  
Once again, PCHR is not the body of positive laws that today serve as reference to either the 
European Court of Justice or the European Court of Human Rights in the exercise of their specific 
                                                                                                                                
Relativism, Christianity, Islam / Joseph Ratzinger Now Pope Benedict Xvi, Marcello Pera ; Foreword by George 
Weigel ; Translated by Michael F. Moore, ed. Marcello Pera, George Weigel, and Michael F. Moore (New York, N.Y. 
:: Basic Books, 2006), 94-97.  
95 With the European Convention of Human Rights as main text of reference ("European Convention on Human 
Rights," International Convention, European Court of Human Rights, no. 3 May 2002 (2010), 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-
5C9014916D7A/0/CONVENTION_ENG_WEB.pdf.) and the European Court of Human Rights located in Strasbourg 
as institutional symbol and practical organ. Plus the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union / European Union, ed. Parliament European and Commission European 
([Luxembourg] :: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2001). 
96 This is not to say that it cannot exist somewhere else (other “western” democracies for instance).  
work. PCHR is rather the inspiration behind them, an inspiration not very different from that which 
originated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations.  
Therefore, using analogical hermeneutics, we are talking of PCHR as an analogical language. A 
language not equivalent to the body of positive laws today in use at the EU and in wider Europe 
(laws which may continue to multiply and which may be closer to or further away from the original 
values which inspired them). The original values in all of their purity could be the univocal end. 
The positive laws that multiply and may at some point contradict each other are the equivocal 
side. PCHR is an analogical way between one extreme and the other.  
As I have tried to show, analogical hermeneutics runs through the whole Series, on each of the 
topics. It provides insights on how to conciliate between very different facets in a variety of 
problems. Unity, identity, political culture, and human rights can all be understood in a different 
way, and acquire new light by using this method.  
Having reviewed in the first section the problem of European political unity and in this second 
section the general approach to the matter, the question about how and where to ground unity—
the question about political identity must be undertaken. This is what I intend next.  
 
The key to political unity: political identity 
There is extensive literature about “European identity”. European identity is associated with 
“source of unity” for the polity.97 When I first tried to form for myself a general idea about it, I 
realised the complexity of the task. Even before getting to the second part of the term, the first 
one presented incredible problems. European is an adjective whose noun is Europe. But what is 
Europe? Not even geographically can it be defined neatly, as America (the American Continent, 
one huge piece of land surrounded by water and only divided by an artificial channel in Panama) 
or Antarctica. Besides “identity,” from the Latin “the same” can have a host of different meanings 
which vary depending on the field of study, from mathematics to metaphysics, from sociology to 
politics, from psychology to cultural studies, and of course political science and political 
philosophy.  
Months after I started a literature review on the topic I was able to find certain patterns under 
which the many articles on the subject could be classified. Building on the work of researchers 
who had undertook this classification I took a few streams which would be pertinent for my own 
research. They must concern my field of interest—the social and political philosophy of European 
studies—and provide some answer to the main problem of my research, namely the political unity 
of Europe. In Normative Conceptions98 I carried out a conceptual analysis of the problem of 
European political identity, and of some of its more important aspects (political form, political 
culture, and political community). Over three articles on the subject I reviewed the terminology to 
designate each of the positions on European identity.99 Following some reflection I came to think 
that perhaps the most accurate names for the five “normative conceptions” could be “cultural,” 
“legal,” “social,” “international” and “cosmopolitan.” 
                                            
97 See: Jiménez Lobeira, "EU Citizenship and Political Identity: The Demos and Telos Problems; "Exploring 
Cosmopolitan Communitarianist EU Citizenship – an Analogical Reading." 
98 "Normative Conceptions of European Identity - a Synthetic Approach; "EU Analogical Identity - or the Ties That 
Link (without Binding); "EU Citizenship and Political Identity: The Demos and Telos Problems; "Liberal Democracy: 
Culture Free? The Habermas-Ratzinger Debate and Its Implications for Europe."  
99 "EU Analogical Identity - or the Ties That Link (without Binding); "Normative Conceptions of European Identity - a 
Synthetic Approach." The other article preceded Normative Conceptions and was published in the Proceedings of a 
conference in Sydney, but is not included in the Series.  
 They first one refers to the cultural heritage that is common to Europeans from different regions, 
and that includes elements like history, geography, religion, and art. The second one refers to the 
law which arguably all Europeans contribute to form. The third conception regards economic and 
social benefits, summarised as “the European way of life”. The fourth looks at how Europe can 
have an influence in the international arena, and an image as a “normative power”. Finally the 
fifth conception attempts to present cosmopolitanism as the feature that can unite Europeans.100  
As much as all of them contain arguments to favour their case, each of them faces significant 
objections: Europe’s cultural heritage cannot determine—and it may be radically different from—
cultural trends today, especially if immigration is taken into consideration; there is no “European 
Constitution,” and the way in which the laws that bind European countries together follows a 
process that it would be a stretch to call democratic; the budget necessary to maintain the 
“European way of life,” the welfare system (short working weeks, long paid holiday periods, early 
retirement schemes…) are being revisited and shrink by the day; Europe’s international image 
can be at times laudable,101 but at others less dignified;102 and cosmopolitanism, if truthful, 
embraces the whole world and does not especially distinguish Europe from other cosmopolitanly-
oriented regions of the world.103  
After some thought I submitted the idea that European identity—if there is one—might be rather 
conceived as a synthesis, a combination of the definitions above. There is no need, I think, to 
choose the legal aspect of identity and discard the cosmopolitan one, or to choose the 
international one and discard the cultural one. When it comes to political identity, those positions 
can actually become features of a single European identity, perhaps less defined and strong, but 
still real and flexible to cater for diversity. 
I arrived at that conclusion at the end of Normative Conceptions104 and undertook the task of 
outlining what European identity could look like in Analogical Identity.105 I showed how the 
different facets of identity not only did not conflict with each other, but on closer analysis 
complemented each other and become richer once combined. With the aid of analogical 
hermeneutics, each aspect was taken neither under a univocal interpretation which would 
exclude others, nor under an equivocal one which gave place to incommensurable, parallel 
positions. An analogical interpretation enriched them with some plasticity so that each of them 
could be combined and harmonised with the others.  
But European identity, in the realm of political unity calls for at least two questions. The first one 
is: who are the putative bearers of such identity? And the second: what is the institutional result of 
their unity? I pursued the answer to these questions in Political Identity.106 To the first question, 
the answer was the citizens of the polity, or the EU citizens. Their citizenship derives from being 
citizens of an EU member state. The political community of EU citizens is, on closer examination, 
                                            
100 "Normative Conceptions of European Identity - a Synthetic Approach," 160-66. 
101 As in the case of developments in the solution to the problem of Kosovo and Serbia: see: Piotr Smolar, "Serbia 
and Kosovo Sign Historic Agreement,"  The Guardian(2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/30/serbia-
kosovo-historic-agreement-brussels.  
102 See the contradicting messages sent by EU diplomacy in Bahrain: JUDY DEMPSEY, "Turning up the Volume on 
Human Rights in Europe,"  The New York Times(2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/world/europe/09iht-
letter09.html?_r=0. 
103 In fact, often in the same region some people are more cosmopolitan than others. It may even be that 
cosmopolitans are part of an elite that has received more education and has had the opportunity to travel more than 
ordinary people. To be sure, it makes for a nice ideal, but of scarce credentials when it comes to finding a source of 
unity for Europeans. 
104 Jiménez Lobeira, "Normative Conceptions of European Identity - a Synthetic Approach." 
105 "EU Analogical Identity - or the Ties That Link (without Binding)." 
106 "EU Citizenship and Political Identity: The Demos and Telos Problems." 
a sort of conglomerate of member states’ citizens. They are not “a people,” but rather peoples. 
Not, using the Greek term, a demos but rather a group of demoi.  
This first aspect of political identity presents a number of very serious conceptual and practical 
difficulties, which I introduced above in this exegetic introduction,107 but in sum having to do with 
the apparent contradiction of being citizen of two polities. In Political Identity108 the answer was a 
nuanced approach to citizenship, considering the possibility of subordinate affiliations, allowing 
for differentiated allegiances—the one to the member state stronger than the one to the EU, but 
with the latter still existing. Therefore a subordinate identity which entails a weaker unity than the 
state (main referent) makes sense from the perspective of analogical hermeneutics, and rather 
than being a problem it becomes a feature of a polity of polities like the EU is.  
The answer to the second question—that regarding the EU polity not from the point of view of the 
peoples integrating it, but the entity as a whole—reveals a puzzle that along the years of its 
existence has captured the attention of many researchers: what exactly is the EU? It is a question 
about the telos or end, the goal of the EU as a whole, and its regime.  
In Cosmopolitan Communitarian109 I surveyed three different positions on this question. The EU 
for some should lean towards an international, free trade organisation. It needs to loosen the 
already excessive ties between the member states. A second position (sustained, among others, 
by Jürgen Habermas) advocates a postnational federation—the United States of Europe—a fully- 
fledged federal state. The third position suggests a hybrid: a mixed-commonwealth—a term 
coined by Neil McCormick and explained and expanded by Joseph Weiler, Richard Bellamy and 
Rainer Bauböck among others.  
If this third position is not new, its relevance has in my opinion grown as the other two have 
proven insufficient or inadequate for “the nature of the beast”. The EU, due to its composition by 
demoi and the way it was formed and has unfolded throughout the years, and due to the 
importance that diversity has in Europe as I have stressed above, the EU, I say, can better fulfil 
its purposes and its functions serving the peoples of Europe by continuing to be a stateless polity. 
What my thesis brings to the study of this position is an original conceptual framework to visualise 
a regime that could otherwise appear chaotic or at least dysfunctional, and as way to help a 
decision between the three models based on analogical hermeneutics.  
Analogical hermeneutics provides a way to see the importance of each member state (and 
national groups inside them), and seek a type of unity that maintains national diversity as much 
as possible, while still having some links between the different national groups. This 
understanding helps to envisage a mixed-commonwealth not necessarily as a transition towards 
a federal state, but as a possible regime in itself.  
The stateless polity also makes sense if one attends to the historical reasons that motivated the 
founders and designers of the European project at its beginnings. The two world wars in the first 
half of the last century contained a very incendiary ingredient often called nationalism, but which I 
purposely denote as “statism”. Throughout the Series I tried to signal how slippery the concept of 
“nation” is, and how it could be better pinned down by using the related notion of “state” (much 
more concrete and definable in legal terms).110 
The “nationalism” that created confrontation and the near destruction of Europe—and other 
regions of the world—in the XX century, is more a use of the idea of nation by states, than a real 
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109 "Exploring Cosmopolitan Communitarianist EU Citizenship – an Analogical Reading." 
110 Perhaps a similar case is seen in the concepts of political identity and citizenship. See: "EU Citizenship and 
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 confrontation between nations. In part because nations do not coincide with states—there can be 
several nations (Scotland, Wales, etc.) in a state (the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland) or a nation may be scattered along several states (e.g. Romanians in Moldova, 
Italy, Spain, Germany). When a state appropriates the idea of a certain nation and uses it to 
depict others as enemies or as inferior (therefore despicable), then “nationalism” becomes 
dangerous. But the phenomenon is rather the promotion of a state masquerading as a nation. 
To be sure, national groups do conflict with each other from time to time. But it is only when 
nationalism is taken as the official ideology, an instrument of propaganda for a state, that it 
becomes damaging and destructive. It was this exasperation of the state that took Europe to fight 
internally and to bleed nearly to death in the XX century. Perhaps: Weiler recognises this nuance, 
as he points out how ironic it would be for a project created precisely to keep the power of states 
in check (through supranational, that is, suprastatal, authorities but also consensus and 
negotiation—the “community method”)should end up producing a massive state.  
Thus, an idea that evolved as the Series unfolded was that the important contrast when studying 
the EU’s regime is not between “federation” and “commonwealth,” but between “state,” and 
stateless polity. The opposition between “mixed-commonwealth” and “federation,”111 was 
therefore better rephrased as one between a stateless polity and a (presumably federal) state, 
because both regimes contain varying degrees of federation.112 
Suprastatism is an alternative to (state-) nationalism or postnationalism.113 As mentioned above, 
statism is the reality hidden in the more catchy term “nationalism.” It is no secret that at the height 
of “nationalism” in the first half of the XX century, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and 
many other European countries were hosts to different national groups—an eminent (though not 
the only ) one being the Jewish People. The war waged in the name of nation was in practice 
carried out by states. Perhaps it was not “the German nation” but rather the state of the Third 
Reich the one promoted and exalted via Nazi propaganda.  
Today this reality becomes apparent when from time to time discussions about “minorities” are 
sparked in countries like Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Ukraine, Germany, 
Finland, France, the United Kingdom, or even Sweden. Those minorities are at times formed by 
linguistic groups of migrants to Europe, but often they are just national groups associated with 
neighbouring countries. State borders (take for instance those of Austria or Hungary) change with 
wars and other historical events. They do not always coincide with national groups. A state may 
host several national groups (say Welsh, Scots, Irish and English in the United Kingdom), and a 
national group can be spread along three or four countries (e.g. Catalans in France, Andorra and 
Spain).  
Few people feel inspired by a state; many can be enthusiastic about a “nation”. In the XIX and XX 
century the hard sell (state) was dressed up with the much more appealing idea of nation. Yet, as 
mentioned above, wars were not fought between nations but between states. Robert Schumann, 
born in a region that historically has belonged to the states of Germany and France at different 
moments, understood this perfectly and from the beginning of the European project advocated for 
“supranationalism,”114 a concept that Weiler has grasped and developed.115 Supranationalism is 
a very important concept for understanding the notions of “mixed commonwealth,”116 and 
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“community of states”. Along the Series I have reflected on the concept and come to deem it 
clearer if denominated suprastatism, to emphasise that it is intended to keep states in check.  
Therefore the EU as it is today provides a way to harmonise different member states and their 
own state interests in an overarching political structure, which though suprastatal remains at the 
same time a non-state itself. The EU could be regarded as an “ugly duckling” case, characterised 
by an analogical telos (the mixed commonwealth) and an analogical demos (in reality a gathering 
of demoi sharing a weak common identity).117  
Thus, political unity has its source in a common political identity, which is given on the one hand 
by the people that make up the political community—in the case of the EU the analogical demos 
integrated by several demoi from different member states—and in the other by a common regime, 
a political architecture that allows the different states and nations in the EU to form a stateless 
polity. But still the question remains about what can give sufficient cohesion to that polity in order 
to keep it together. Why the mixed-commonwealth regime and the political community of EU 
citizens will, for instance, be solidary with each other. This question takes us to the next section. 
 
The content of political identity: political culture 
Important normative premises outlined in this section are the value of national cultures 
(showcased by the corresponding languages) and the relevance of spiritual and moral values in 
the grounding of European identity.118 
According to Ratzinger, laws—even those attained democratically—can be unjust. Therefore 
neither democracy nor (positive law) by themselves can provide the standard for justice. A 
different point of reference, antecedent to positive law may be needed to provide such a 
standard. This antecedent has been called in different traditions “natural,” “people’s,” “moral” or 
“rational” law.119  
Such antecedent conveys the idea that there is a more or less objective set of norms or juridical 
principles, manifest to all—even if in constant need of deepening, clarification and expression—
that ground our everyday (positive) laws.120 Human rights seem to be situated in this category of 
norms of principles. Even when not always enshrined in positive or quasi-positive law (charters), 
they are present in the original intuitions that inspired documents such as the Magna Carta 
Libertatum in England (1215), the Declaration of Rights of Man and of the Citizen in France 
(1789), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and the European Convention of 
Human Rights (1950), among others. 
For Habermas, legitimacy is generated by legality: if all citizens have participated in the 
elaboration of laws, or at least the core of all laws, the Constitution, the ensuing political system, 
and derived body of laws governing the state will be legitimate—accepted by all. Hence no 
source of authority or legitimacy is antecedent to the law.121 And yet, the source of the law—the 
political community integrated by people—is never in reality absent from cultural background and 
specific systems of belief. Each deliberant possesses a worldview that is normative and in this 
sense “moral”. Indeed, the law did not come into existence by itself, but was brought into 
existence by a body of people, the constituents or citizens, who in addition to being political 
agents are also human beings, and as such “cultured” (i.e. immersed in a specific culture—
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 evident in their use of a particular language, for instance, and holding a certain worldview). 
Therefore the law possesses a moral antecedent or foundation. 
When Ratzinger speaks of human rights he places them in the context of a law that is rational.122 
Both secular and religious rationalities can and should participate in the human rationality of 
human rights which is universal, in the sense that it comprehends perhaps: every human being, 
individually and collectively. 
Because of this, human rights potentially appeal to all and become a language of communication 
for every human being regardless of their particular cultural background, worldview or system of 
belief—whether religious or secular. Human rights would be, from this perspective, intrinsic 
human values, inherent to being human. These values (rights and duties) can be discovered, 
understood, and clarified, but not exactly invented. They are objective values, therefore, 
notwithstanding that they might always be imperfectly understood and subject to better 
understanding and explanation.123  
Yet human rights are regarded with varying degrees of acceptance in different parts of the world. 
For all the universality in their title they are in reality accepted without reserve primarily only in the 
West. In other words, a worldwide agreement on human rights is a long way off.124 Nevertheless, 
human rights can be common currency in smaller regions of the world, and it is advanced in the 
Series that the EU is one of such regions.  
Now if “moral” (i.e. pre-positive) foundations are essential to successful democracies where 
human rights are upheld and the rule of law is the order of the day, then they should be 
considered as a plausible source of cohesion for the European Polity.125 In other words, the 
normative foundations for human rights, the rule of law (their guarantor), and democracy (their 
natural environment) are values held in all European countries (even if not fulfilled to the same 
extent in all of them) and are thus a source of mutual understanding. These values were present 
from the beginnings of integration.126 
For this reason I explored human rights as the possible common language of political culture, and 
a source of European political identity. Human rights (which imply also the rule of law and 
democracy) provide the content for a shared political culture in the EU. They constitute a common 
language which is recurrent throughout the Series.127  
This common language, with the potential to unify a very diverse polity runs from the first to the 
last article of the Series. Such language is in a way part of the content of European identity.128 
Human rights are indeed a language capable of containing and expressing a common identity in 
the realms of culture, polity, the economy, international image, and cosmopolitanism.  
The idea of human rights (and those related to democracy and the rule of law), when studied in 
their historical context, reveals itself as more than a purely formal concept. The political culture of 
human rights (PCHR) was born in a very specific normative ground rooted in Judaism, 
Christianity, and the Enlightenment.129 Today, human rights have been incorporated into the 
positive laws of all EU countries. But it should not be forgotten were they came from, in order to 
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avoid the illusion of thinking that these Western concepts are “value” free or devoid of any cultural 
background.130  
In fact human rights and its associated notions have sprung from (and at the same time 
constantly inform the content of) a political culture that pervades all of the EU member states. 
Awareness of an existing political culture in Europe (partly traceable back to religion) can help to 
deal with cultural (sometimes closely associated with religious) diversity, a situation (as 
mentioned above) caused by unprecedented immigration from other parts of the world and which 
has created tensions in the public sphere and a debate about the possibility of social cohesion in 
a more diverse Europe.131 New avenues for social understanding based on a relational 
paradigm132 and interculturalism133 are needed to meet the challenges that Europe faces today 
(see corresponding section below). But PCHR can serve as the common platform and starting 
point.  
Since both the secular tradition of the Enlightenment and the religious tradition of Judeo-
Christianity have been normative sources of the PCHR, both traditions deserve a voice in the 
debate about the common language for Europe. Both traditions must be present in the public 
sphere and enter into an enriching dialog with other increasingly important sources of political 
culture in Europe, such as Islam. Secularist worldviews, while rightly deserving their place in the 
public sphere, should not be allowed to monopolise the field of discussion, and even less should 
citizens holding religious views be banned from the public sphere.134  
Beuchot sees human rights as a key for the transcultural grammar, and his idea set me to think 
about human rights as a strong candidate to be the common language for understanding between 
Europeans.135 Human rights could perhaps be a good “exchange currency.”136 Not because 
human rights are exclusively European: they can be successfully used in other parts of the world. 
Rather, and in a very unpretentious manner, human rights could perhaps function as a common 
medium for communication, an analogical language in Europe.137  
 
The stage of political culture: the public sphere 
If political unity is the problem that the Series focused on, the key concept to address it was 
political identity; the core of that concept was political culture;138 the stage in which it could be 
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 analysed was the political (or “public”) sphere; and the way to building identity through the 
creation of a common political culture in the public sphere, and consequently solidarity was 
relational interculturalism. In this section I would like to explain the importance of the public 
sphere for unity, and why the secularism v religion debate matters in this respect. 
Given that culture entails views about meaning (of self, of the world, of the unknown), in the 
Series I touched on the discussion of secularism and religion. After all, secular and religious 
worldviews influence and inform cultural backgrounds.   
Rather than pretending to be a purely formal polity (neutral in normative terms), the EU should 
recognise its sources and be aware of them when new Europeans with different cultural and 
therefore normative perspectives come to the public sphere. This suggestion runs through the 
Series and is one of its key proposals to generate a cohesive society and a workable European 
identity that contributes to its political unity. 
If moral foundations are essential to successful democracies where human rights are upheld and 
the rule of law is the order of the day, then they should be taken into consideration as source of 
cohesion for the European polity.139 
Ratzinger’s binary “reason-religion” (or secular v religious reason) is in reality shorthand for two 
different (but not mutually exclusive) kinds of rationality. The former is based on what Taylor calls 
“the immanent frame;” the latter on a transcendent frame.140 They are in my view just different 
types of rationality. The human capacity to reason, to argue in an intelligent way, to support 
rationally what one believes in, is present as much in individuals with an immanent frame of mind 
(say, Sam Harris), as much as in someone with a transcendent one (e.g. the Dalai Lama). Both 
can give a reasoned defence of their positions about life, human beings, the world, the polity and 
so on. Labelling either of them as unfit for public discussion only because they have an immanent 
or a transcendent worldview would be unfair. 
A term that became clearer as the Series progressed was “secularism”. As I have mentioned 
above, it is sometimes taken as a way of arranging public affairs and sometimes as an 
immanentist worldview.141 The distinction between secularity and secularism,142 and the place of 
the second alongside other systems of belief (including religious ones), is an underlying concept 
throughout the Series, and is important for the idea of political identity based on a comprehensive 
(inclusive) political culture and contributing to the goal of political unity.  
Secularity is rooted both in the Biblical and the Enlightenment traditions of Europe.143 The 
analytical contrast between “secular” and “secularist” is used throughout the whole Series, 
contributing to clarifying an often confusing discussion when “the problem of religion” is dealt 
with.144 Neutrality means inclusion and plurality of worldviews, and is equivalent to secularity but 
not to secularism.145 Intolerance, fundamentalism and exclusion are human tendencies and a 
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constant risk for human beings holding nearly any belief system (religious or secular), not a 
special feature of religion or religious people only. 
Therefore complete emptiness or absence of worldviews in the public sphere is nearly 
impossible, and is a delusion when ‘”neutrality” is taken to be a synonym of secularism – itself 
one of the many possible worldviews. Inclusiveness is a more realistic normative goal. It 
translates into a fair opportunity for every worldview to express a voice in the public sphere. A 
secular public sphere, open to all worldviews, is the desirable climate for relational 
interculturalism.146 
There is a distinction or clarification in place when it comes to the term “secularism”. In the case 
of religion, one thing is to have an extreme position that might entail the endorsement of, say, 
terrorism. We would label such a position as “fundamentalist”. Another, very different thing is to 
speak of religion as a respectable worldview, for instance the concept of history (or of law) in 
Judaism. When it comes to secular worldviews the same distinction applies.  They may be 
respectable belief systems or philosophies of life, whereas other such systems could (and 
sometimes do) entail extreme attitudes of hatred or violence that fall into the category of 
fundamentalism. For fanaticism is not a latent danger reserved to religious people: it is a 
tendency into which any human being can fall if not careful (the motive need not be religious).  
Accordingly, in both realms—the immanent or secular and the religious or transcendent—there 
are rational (and easier to reason with) positions and irrational ones (or positions with a violent 
rationality attached to them). The Series refers to the possibility of extremes both in secular and 
religious worldviews. It lacks a distinction between secularism as a sensible worldview, and 
secularism as a fundamentalist worldview.147 In part this is because there is not an equivalent 
distinction for sensible and fundamentalist religious positions either. As long as secularity and 
secularism are distinguished, then “secularism” is a generic term to denote immanent (secular) 
belief systems, with an open connotation (reasonable or fundamentalist) as happens with the 
generic term “religion,” which denotes transcendent belief systems with an open connotation too. 
Another term for inclusiveness in the public sphere is pluralism.148 Even if I do not agree with him 
completely (as explained above) regarding his approach to the public sphere, I have taken 
Habermas as referent in the dialogue between religion and secularism because, in my opinion, he 
adopts an open immanent frame. He invites conversation not only about but also with each 
other.149 And he has been the first one to practice it. He has sat down to speak with prominent 
figures from both secular and religious circles (among others come to mind John Rawls, Charles 
Taylor, Joseph Ratzinger), has seriously pondered their arguments, and has come up with 
proposals to carry that dialogue ahead.  
Furthermore, Habermas’s intuition of speaking not only about each other but also with each other 
sits well with a relational interculturalist paradigm and with an analogical hermeneutics approach, 
both of which seek to harmonise, to find solutions, and to think creatively about complex and 
often polarised situations such as the debate of secularism v religion in the public sphere (which 
is a recurrent theme throughout the Series).150   
Europe living in a secular and yet “post-secularist” age is a good description of the cultural 
situation of the continent (following the distinction between “secularity” and “secularism,” see 
above). Europe seems to be entering an age in which—using Taylor’s terms—the frame is still 
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 immanent (in other words secular) but more open to the possibility of transcendence (i.e. not 
secularist).151  
Habermas’s position and approach to the problem contrasts with Beck’s. The former clearly 
defines and acknowledges his perspective, and seems to have given a great deal of thought to 
perspectives different from his.152 Habermas gives a great analysis and sound guidelines on how 
to address the problem of equal citizenship and diversity of worldviews, or a united political 
identity in the face of multiple cultural identities.153  
Singapore’s case, in many ways so far apart from the EU (and so difficult to compare with 
Europe), sheds some light however, for instance when it comes to the treatment of diverse 
cultural positions (with their corresponding worldviews), the pursuit of social coherence and the 
goal of political unity.154 
At any rate, Europe should not be afraid of its own cultural self-understanding from the past and 
present, including traditions such as Judaism, Christianity, the Enlightenment and Islam, among 
others, in order to build its future.155 The Bible and Enlightenment appear as strong referents of 
Europe’s political culture from the beginnings of integration.156 
The only way to build and maintain a liberal democracy is by being “truly liberal and truly 
democratic”.157 The Series advocates respect for all worldviews, both secular and religious, in 
particular for Muslims, but also New Atheists, Jews, Christians and others. The recognition of and 
respect for different cultural positions is essential for social harmony and political unity. 158 
Clearly, not everything is up for negotiation culturally, even in liberal democracies. Because 
democracy, the rule of law, and other elements of what I have called the political culture of human 
rights (PCHR) are substantive, not only formal.159 It is schizophrenic and dangerous to pretend 
that the political culture of Europe—that of human rights—is exclusively formal.160 It does not 
convince those newcomers who possess a different culture (especially if that culture contains a 
strong religious background),and it makes it difficult to explain the very fundaments of western 
democracy and some of its limits.161 
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As can be seen along this exegetic introduction, my research has extended to five main fields: 
political unity, political identity, political culture, the public sphere, and relational interculturalism. 
Tangentially I have touched on the economic realm, submitting the possibility of flexible 
integration. The research is situated in the context of history and with awareness of the EU’s 
present challenges.162  
Now desirable (and in my opinion feasible) results are: from a suprastatal political regime, 
analogical unity; from an inclusive public sphere, a common political culture; and from relational 
interculturalism, a sufficiently cohesive community of citizens,163 where solidarity or civic 
friendship can flourish. I intend to explain this last aspect in the ensuing section.  
 
Building identity and solidarity: relational interculturalism 
Interculturalism is another important concept throughout the Series. It constitutes a way to deal 
with diversity and build political identity based on a common political culture, in order to maintain 
and increase political unity to an acceptable level.164 Donati’s relational sociology helps 
interculturalism and links with the topic of the common language (also present in every article of 
the Series).165  
Formally, political unity is built in an inclusive public sphere through relational interculturalism. 
The initial substantive element of the political culture is that of human rights.  
I have connected Donati’s concept of relationality with Beuchot’s idea of human rights as a 
common language and with his cultural analogical pluralism. That connection could be developed 
further than it has been so far.166 I take up this idea again in Europe United.167 
The term relational interculturalism did not appear as such in the Series. Rather, the concept 
developed gradually through reflection and it is only at the end of it that I have defined it, if only 
provisionally. Designating an invitation to blend, the idea itself is a blend drawing from Canadian 
(Bouchard, Taylor), Indian (Panikkar), Italian (Zamagni, Donati), and Latin American (Fornet-
Betancourt, Beuchot) developments.168 Yet the intercultural trend is of course not limited to those 
regions. The forty seven member state Council of Europe (antecedent to the European Union and 
distinctly different to the EU) in 2008 published a White Paper on the subject.169 A common 
thread in the intercultural analyses seems to be the need to find alternatives to multiculturalism 
which are not regressive (that is, alternatives to the view that sees monoculturalism, or blind 
assimilation as the only possible forms of social integration). Relational interculturalism, as I have 
come to see it, is not so much a challenge to multiculturalism, as it is a constructive effort to 
improve the latter’s shortcomings.  
Interculturalism needs to be qualified lest it become just another word for multiculturalism, at least 
moderate multiculturalism. Yet relationality in my view provides an adequate nuance which 
indicates how the social blending that interculturalism promises might come about. 
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 The two papers in which I dedicate several sections to speaking about Interculturalism are Worth 
Fighting and Cultural Riddles.170 Relational Interculturalism links with political culture, the public 
sphere, political identity and in the end with political unity, though it is none of them and requires 
a separate treatment.  
Relational Interculturalism is the way in which political culture is formed in the public sphere to 
generate identity and eventually civic friendship or solidarity, and therefore unity. It regards the 
path through which very diverse societies (and political communities) can work towards a 
common identity, rather than to the cultural annihilation of the newcomers (monoculturalism) or 
the creation of cultural ghettos or parallel societies (present in at least some forms of 
multiculturalism).171  
In order to understand what relational means for Interculturalism, I would like to bring to mind the 
way in which Donati defines his semantics of difference. This is important because it clarifies how 
he proposes to deal with diversity. And as mentioned above, the key to the problem of cultural 
plurality is how to harmonise cultural diversity without, on the one hand cancelling it 
(monoculturalism) or on the other hand fostering the creation of cultural archipelagos with little 
interconnection between them, eventually leading to a fragmented society (multiculturalism).  
In the dialectic semantics difference is “a gap (border) between Ego and Alter. Between them, 
there is no sharing of specific identities but rather an assertion of two identities comparing with 
each other.”172 In this semantics “reciprocity does not require recognition of a common 
identity.”173 Habermas’s discursive ethics is for Donati an example of this semantics of difference 
in which “Ego and Alter have divergent and clashing identities.”174  
In binary semantics difference is “conceived as a discrimination and incommunicability.” 
Accordingly, “Alter is a denial of Ego and cannot ‘be included’ by Ego (and vice versa).”175  An 
example of this semantics is for Donati self-referential systems of functional and mechanist 
nature such as that of Luhman.176  
Finally, in relational semantics, the difference itself—dividing Ego and Alter—is conceived as a 
relation. “The relation,” claims Donati “is constitutive of both Ego and Alter.”177 This is because 
each one’s identity is shaped through the relation to the other. Donati points out that relation 
implies on the one hand distance (non-identity between Alter and Ego) but on the other hand it 
brings about sharing of two uniquenesses. Relation envisages the other neither as alter Ego, nor 
as a totally Alter.  
Here is where these thoughts from two different thinkers, in two different continents, and studying 
two different disciplines, can coincide. Indeed Donati’s relationality operates in a similar or 
corresponding way to the one Beuchot’s analogical hermeneutics would advise. And this position 
is at the core of the interculturalism that I have sought to submit in the Series. Hence I have 
called it relational interculturalism.  
As already explained above, relational interculturalism will navigate between monoculturalism 
(where extrapolating Donati’s terms the other is accepted as long as it is an Alter Ego) and 
                                            
170 Jiménez Lobeira, "Is Europe Still Worth Fighting For? Allegiance, Identity, and Integration Paradigms Revisited; 
"Cultural Riddles of Regional Integration - a Reflection on Europe from the Asia Pacific." 
171 "Is Europe Still Worth Fighting For? Allegiance, Identity, and Integration Paradigms Revisited," 6-7. 
172 Donati, "Beyond the Dilemmas of Multiculturalism: Recognition through ‘Relational Reason’," 69. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid., 70. 
176 Ibid. 
177 "Beyond Multiculturalism: Recognition through the Relational Reason," Polish Sociological Review, no. 166 
(2009): 70. (My italics). 
multiculturalism (where the other becomes an incommensurable, totally Alter). Relational 
interculturalism can and should be tested in that subcontinent which Europe is, and used to 
address the challenge of socially integrating the peoples from very diverse cultural backgrounds 
who reside there.  
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